Experimenting African-centered Solutions: The Case of African Union Mission in Somalia (AMISOM)

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Abstract

As one of the various milestone attempts that depict the transformation of the African myopia of wholly blaming the West for internal peace and security challenges in the continent and waiting them for Solutions, the African Union (AU) deployed its first Mission to Somalia under the code name African Union Mission in Somalia (AMISOM). It is debatable whether this Mission qualifies to the spirit of the notion of African-centered Solutions (AfSol), and meets its pillars i.e., ownership, commitment and shared values—in its design, process and practice. This article examines the applicability of these pillars to multilateral peace operations in Africa, such as AMISOM, using qualitative research methods. Legally speaking, the AU owns the Mission for it authorized the mandate establishing the force and its deployment. Secondly, all the troops of the Mission come from Africa. However, the Mission lacks public ownership in that the African traditional methods have been ignored and grassroots’ participation in the design, process and practice has been overruled. Moreover, neither the individual African states nor the AU took the commitment to finance or provide logistics to the Mission or even involve the African populace to do so. It is also reflected that the Troop Contributing Countries share meager semblance of values in the Mission and have divergent interests across multiple issues pertaining to Somalia. The article contemplates that AMISOM does not meet the three pillars. Seemingly, the three pillars painlessly explain bottom-up peace and statebuilding approaches such as the Guurti model in Somaliland, unlike top-down approaches or multilateral peace operations such as AMISOM. Therefore, the article recommends researchers to further refine and redefine the pillars in a way that simultaneously qualifies the two approaches.

Keywords: IGAD, AMISON, AfSol, peace and security, African traditional methods, Guurti model, Ubuntu
1. Background

Africa is predominantly portrayed as the continent of poverty, conflicts, inter-state wars, undemocratic governments, human right violations and unconstitutional changes of governments as well as the lack of commitment to tackle their problems among others (Musewe, 2103). In addition, Africans themselves often blame their failures to external circumstances and seek for solutions from outside help without really considering the repercussions of the pledged assistance (Bradbury, 2008).

In the final years of the Cold War politics many Africans turned to the World Bank (WB) and the International Monetary Fund (IMF) in a wider policy shift of the OAU to prioritize liberalism and structural adjustment reforms leading to frameworks promoting inexpedient Western solutions for the continent’s problems (Institute for Peace and Security Studies hereafter referred as IPSS, 2014). These reforms have had disastrous inputs in the economies and social lives of the African people. Meanwhile with the demise of the United Soviet Socialist Republic (USSR) Africa seemed strategically unimportant to the West, specifically in the aftermath of the Cold War, leading to the subsequent failures of governments and the occurrence of civil wars in many parts of the continent (Bradbury, 2008).

Somalia was one of the countries that immediately collapsed with a protracted civil war. The subsequent UN Mission in Somalia (UNOSOM) in early 1990s turned catastrophic hence leading to the Western indifference of the Rwandan genocide as it unfolded and watched many other African nations as they ravaged. This nonchalance enticed Africans not to fully depend and rely on external support and solutions but to take their matters in their own hands. Hence, the re-birth of Ali Mazrui’s *Pas Africana* “African Solution to African problems” emerged in the African political atmosphere.

The establishment of the AU in 2002 brought a renewed sense of optimism in Africa after the dark years of the 1990’s that witnessed more than a third of the continent engulfed in wars and indescribable tragedies (De Waal, 2009). According to the preamble of the Constitutive Act of the AU, African leaders adopted a non-indifference policy so as to manage peace and security challenges in the continent. Thus, following the Tripoli declaration on the “Elimination of Conflicts in Africa and the Promotion of Sustainable Peace” in 2009, the Heads of States further recognized peace and security as “an intellectual challenge” and stressed “the need to build the capacity of African universities and research institutes to explore the nature of African conflicts, to investigate what succeeds and what
fails in conflict resolution efforts and to arrive at African-centered solutions” (AU, 2009). Thus, as part of its mandate from the African Union, the Institute for Peace and Security Studies in Addis Ababa (IPSS) is tasked with the conceptualization of AfSol to develop a concrete meaning and an operational approach in line with the framework of AU agenda 2063 and the new initiatives in peace and security (IPSS, 2014).

Following the mandate extended to IPSS by the African Union (AU) and the Memorandum of Understanding signed between IPSS and the AU Peace and Security Department (AUPSD), the Institute became committed to train, research and promote African Solutions by developing approaches better adapted to African realities. As part of its African Peace and Security Program, IPSS launched a research project on African-centered Solutions (AfSol) to take up the intellectual challenge to define and operationalize it in the areas of peace and security within the interface of peace-security-governance-development nexus in 2013.

The overarching discussion in this research will reveal that, despite the limitations and debates in the field by both pros and cons of the AfSol concept, there are many attempts to conceive and implement an African led solution to its peace and security problems. It is perceived widely by African political and socio-cultural institutions, political leadership and peoples at the grassroots as a home-grown inspiring concept that empowers Africans to own and, therefore, administer their path to peace and development in this interdependent and ever-changing world (Osman et al., 2014). However, the same research despite its inquisitive design, failed to provide a meaningful conception that puts AfSol in an operational manner that will pioneer a comprehensive framework that guides the articulation and evaluation of African-centered solutions.

Meanwhile, in continuation for the quest of defining „AfSol“, IPSS convened a workshop on September, 2014, attended by selected key scholars and personalities, from different parts of Africa. The experts were given the task to streamline and dissect the historical discourses, process and conceptual underpinnings of AfSol. The report from this workshop highlighted that AfSol should not be seen as giving Africans exclusive say in peace and security but it is to provide a framework for Africans to assist one another before resorting to external actors (IPSS, 2014). The experts in this workshop recognized and generated a common understanding that, AfSol is a strategy in action based on the conviction of African ownership, commitment and shared values. These three pillars have been adapted as constitutive grounds for future discussions and researches on AfSol (Ibid).
Consequently, the IPSS organized a workshop on African Solutions on March 2014, to further define and refine the AfSol concept with practical cases on its implementation and applicability having been presented. At this juncture, in an attempt to concretize the meaning of the concept, Dawit Yohannes, put forward that state-centric conception of sovereignty hinders AfSol as an implementation strategy for the fact that the quest for collective African solutions undermines the challenge posed by state-centric conceptions of sovereignty towards collective regional security (Dawit, 2015). This implies that states need to sacrifice some degree of their sovereignty for the sake of partnership towards a collective implementation of AfSol.

Admittedly, the concept as mentioned above should fulfill the three pillars of AfSol according to the IPSS approach: commitment, shared values and ownership. However, there is a contention on who are the parties to be committed to make a particular AfSol effort into a reality; who are the agencies to share particular sets of values; or who are the agencies to define African problems and who formulates their solutions? The available literature does not provide, in explicit terms, a unanimous dissection in terms of specifically identifying and providing a clear and practical designation on who are to own the „definition“ of the African problems and formulate their solutions; who are to be committed and how they could be committed to ensure ownership of every process; and who could share what values so as to garner collective approach to implement AfSol.

This paper takes a closer look at this lack of act or identification and attempts to highlight the needs to specify the level at which an African actor could design, engineer and implement an AfSol. As it stands now, AfSol could be a strategy utilized in a bottom up (For Example, when spearheaded by local ownership driven by traditional elders). In cases such as the African Union Mission in Somalia (AMISOM), multiplicity and multi-scaled nature of actors makes the definition tricky if not complicated, as the agencies of these actors at times contest and contradict for supremacy. Therefore, this research examines who owns, who shares and who gets committed in implementing AfSol in accordance with the guiding principles of AfSol taking the case of AMISOM.

2. Methodology

This is purely a qualitative paper which explains and analyses the topic in question to a great length. While the existing literature as to what constitutes „African solutions“ is very limited, the paper builds its arguments based on pillars stipulated by the Institute for Peace and Security Studies. It will also review other available views from scholars of different orientations as well as the views of some African leaders. All the data in the literature review was gathered from both primary and secondary resource materials pertaining books,
speeches, journals and reports. Hence, the paper intends to find out AMISOM’s achievements in the peace and statebuilding efforts in Somalia. It will also analyze the perception of the Somali people and government towards AMISOM. It will finally evaluate AMISOM’s agency of ownership, commitment and the values the stakeholders share in the overall engagement.

3. Literature Review

There is little or no consensus on the precise meaning on the term African-led Solutions to African Problems (AfSol). But as largely agreed, it is a concept that offers Africa a leading role in defining its problems and providing solutions to the problems it faces. These solutions are mechanisms owned by Africans at the same time manifested in the African culture, values and realities of societies which encourage the applicability of the solutions they emanate (Murithi, 2005).

The concept is not a new phenomenon in terms of thought. According to Osman, et al., (2014), it dates back to the era of slavery. However, as part of Pan African movement, it was the African diaspora such as the notables Marcus Garvey and W.E.B. Dubois that pushed the African solutions into the limelight. As to the history of the concept, De Waal, (2013) notes that it was in the wake of the liberation of South Africa and the emergence of a “new breed” of post-colonial rulers that the notion of „African solutions for African problems” gained currency although the concept remains vague and can readily be appropriated for different purposes or condemned or ridiculed.

Referring to it as a slogan or rhetoric, Williams (2008) illustrates that the origin of „African Solutions” lie in the anti-colonial struggle and reflect the powerful anti-imperial sentiment that Africans should be free to decide their own futures without being dictated to by outsiders. In this sense, AfSol builds on themes evident in earlier ideas such as the African personality, negritude, and the Try-Africa-First which were important ideological rallying points for Africans in the late nineteenth and early twentieth century (Williams, 2008).

The concept gained impetus in the 21\textsuperscript{st} century as a response to the continent’s increasing
intractable conflicts, famine and poverty. Since the 1960s, the leaders of the continent have been in one way or another embracing AfSol through their summits, declarations, speeches and other platforms. Despite the expressed rhetoric towards this goal, the concept is yet to acquire some form of clarity in how it has developed and how best it can be translated into veritable practice that effectively tackles African problems.

Despite the gaining of widespread and strong attention, the underlying meaning of AfSol seems to have been taken for granted than critically examined. Researchers like Dawit Yohannes (2015) draw attention to the fact that African states lack the capacity to stage effective African-led peace operations in reference to the weaknesses of contemporary African-led peace operations in Burundi (2003-4); Sudan (2004-7); the Comoros (2006, 2007, 2008); and in Somalia (2007-present). Others note the inconsistency between the ownership rhetoric and the lack of commitment, i.e., the continuing dependence on external financial, research and support policy (Osman, et al., 2014). Nyuykonge quoted in Osman, et al. (2014), notes that the term AfSol sometimes treats Africa as one block and knits a framework which fails to apprehend that Africa is so heterogeneous that one ethnic group’s problems may be the solution of another.

3.1. Intellectual Debate on AfSol

A consensus on the definition and approach to AfSol remains evasive. A number of researchers and observers have pointed out the gradation in the meaning, illustration, ownership, and the impacts of its implementation. But, most attempts end up posing more questions than answers needed. Upon hearing the phrase „African Solutions to African problems”, different questions come to mind. Are African problems really African? What constitutes a distinct African problem? Are African problems created by Africans? Having no clear answer for these questions in the available literature shows the fact that AfSol does not have a clear definition so far. Furthermore, attempting to address these questions often ends up in more debate and divergent opinions or even confusion.

The African civil societies, intellectuals, academics, states, the Regional Economic Communities (RECs) and the African Union are literally supportive of African-led solutions that are more effective, efficient and sustainable than those initiatives that are driven – politically, conceptually, and institutionally by non-African institutions (Moller, 2009). However, they take different stances, i.e., some far right, some left right and some lenient on
the issue.

As per the rightists, they are confident that “African Solutions” can make breakthrough achievements in tackling Africa’s peace and security problems. Hutchful (2000) asserts that there is a high demand for the need for an African solution to manage the African peace and security challenges. He stands against Africa asking for external actors directly getting involved in settling African matters for the former deals with issues from the short term perspective. He urges on the need for “African Solutions” to address the deep roots of the conflicts (Hutchful, 2000).

According to Osman et al., (2014), African states have been reduced to implement policies and strategies that have been crafted by non-African actors to the interest of their nations without any consultation or even appreciation of local realities. Africans should be the ones setting the agenda of the discussions and framing the terms of negotiations (Ibid).

Nonetheless, a contending view advanced by the leftists, purports that African problems should not be necessarily solved only with African solutions. Africa has to adopt theories and practices that have worked elsewhere. As de Waal (2013) wonders why a mechanism or institution that has an African cultural label should be more an “African Solution” than a theory or practice drawn from political theory and international experience that has been developed and applied in Africa? He purports that as Meles Zenawi took examples from South Korea, Taiwan and Germany of the 19th century, to theorize his “developmental state”, best examples from elsewhere in the world can also be adapted to solve African problems. In his view, “the advocacy to implement African solutions is consequently an attempt to counter benchmarks that permit impunity (De Waal, 2013:1).

In the same way, there is a view that AfSol is not emulated from sincere intentions of seeking alternative conflict resolution mechanisms to stabilize the continent, but to take over UN peace keeping authority and assert a regional political influence (Murithi, 2005). Groups on this side of the debate are cautious about the prospect of exploiting the indigenous norms, practices and learning to address the root causes of the contemporary African problem. According to these scholars, the continent has less influence and control in defining African conflicts and formulating their solutions, hence the viability of African led solutions to devolve into operational measures capable to identify, contain and effectively resolve African conflicts is unrealistic. This is deduced from the premises that the notion is manipulated by African leaders who are, at least partially, the source of the conflict (Osman et al., 2014).
Some radical thinkers like Musewe (2013), denounce AfSol by arguing that it reflects a limited thinking of Africa’s leadership and that it denies Africa the best solutions to its problems, thus creating an excuse for standard leadership solutions. He urges that Africans need to reject this thinking and continuously seek world class solutions so as to accelerate economic emancipation. He finally suggests that the myth, i.e., AfSol, should be destroyed. However, some people take middle ground regarding the AfSol concept. Speeches of several African leaders draw a glaring picture on the need for effective “African Solutions” that are imbedded in the traditional and cultural heritage of the African people, without ignoring best practices from others and even asking for their cooperation when matters are beyond capacity. For instance, Meles Zenawi (2000), the late prime minister of Ethiopia mentions that “effective ways and means of resolving the underlying causes of conflict in Africa go beyond the realm of mechanisms. The problems are rooted in more fundamental causes which require the appropriate response. These are tasks that need the co-operation of those beyond Africa.” He goes on to stress, as the following quote shows, on the need for African Solutions that adopt convenient experiences from elsewhere while making use of Africa’s traditional mechanisms:

As for principles that should underpin these mechanisms, Africa should and must draw the necessary lessons from the experiences that others have had in this area. But as is also true on other issues, wholesale importation of methods from outside is perhaps not the most effective way for making progress. Africa needs to make use of its own traditional mechanisms of conflict resolution in tandem with whatever is deemed to be useful from the experiences drawn from outside the Continent. We have no monopoly over wisdom in this area, but nor are we totally devoid of traditional values which can come handy for making progress in the resolution of conflicts (Meles, 2000:3).

Similarly, Ayittey (2010), quoted in Osman et al., (2014: 09) argues that “The real African solution is one rooted in African culture, tradition, and heritage, but not cut off from the rest of the world.” Despite such pronouncements, most peace agreements and operations in Africa neglect the involvement of actors at the grass-roots both at the inception and implementation levels as various and solid empirical evidences tell (Apuuli, 2012).

By and large, there is no consensus on the intellectual debate surrounding AfSol. But apparently, “African Solutions” are at high demand. The AU and RECs firmly advocate for
the need to “African Solutions”. Nonetheless, the proper implementation of AfSol by the AU and the RECs is hindered by the over-concentration of African Solutions at the political scene of the Heads of State and Governments than at the grass-root level (Osman, eta al., 2014).

3.2. Guiding Principles of AfSol

Despite extensive use by politicians covered in previous pages, as noted above, the term African-led solutions doesn’t have a clear and definite meaning and most often than not it is understood as Africans looking inward to themselves and taking the lead in deciding their matters and facing the peace and security challenges of the continent by themselves. In an attempt to do so, the AU mandated the IPSS to come up with a clear conceptualization and operationalization of AfSol.

In the endeavor to arrive at a clear meaning for the concept, researchers often face many questions than answers. In designing an AfSol, what is not categorized is the classification of “who is an African”? Taking in consideration into the diversity of the African continent, whose solutions become African? The continent is the home for a range of identities such as Arab African, black African, Tropical African, Caribbean African, and so on. These classifications probed the question if AfSol can be tailored as a one-size-fits-all template or if it is an issue specific question. Another question that remains vague is „who defines AfSol for whom”? At least this is the role of African people, despite the contestation on African identities, and the importance of institutions and legal systems as actors and instruments for defining and executing AfSol (IPSS, 2014).

In the expert workshop at IPSS, it was understood that AfSol is (i) an ideology that dates back to the time of pan-Africanism (ii) AfSol is a philosophy, which dates back to the Nkrumah’s idea of political kingdom (iii) AfSol is a policy in the making and (iv) AfSol can be practiced (IPSS 2014). This classification puts AfSol in the theoretical framework of idealism which refers to AfSol as an aspiration, a desire that reflects African socio- economic and political aspirations. The concept also embodies realism which is reflected in Africa’s collective self-help in peace and security (Ibid).

To make AfSol’s aspiration a reality, key conditions have been forwarded in the workshop to be the pillars of AfSol:

3.1.1. Ownership

African ownership is not about success, but about doing it in one’s own way (IPSS, 2014).
This implies that Africans can tackle their problems better than external actors would do. In this regard, African ownership has to be ensured at every stage of the solutions. Moreover, it does not have to represent the narrow dominance of African leaders in ownership of decision making, but the ownership of African people.

Ownership has to start from, the responsibility for each other and for the challenges Africa faces. AfSol is expected to create a situation where Africans take responsibility for negative contributions and acknowledge best practices. Africans are supposed to be proactive in the process of developing AfSol. It should not only own African problems of conflict management and deployment of peacekeeping Missions but tackle a range of issues including development and democracy. It should also be concerned with long-term solutions and conflict prevention mechanisms that are more inclined to good governance which rests on political will and commitment of leaders, academia and the African people (Osman, et al., 2014).

3.1.2. Commitment

African governments are not yet ready to be financially independent. More than 80% of AU Peace Fund budget comes from external sources (IPSS, 2014), yet it is one of the main pillars of the (APSA). In the years between 2008 and 2011, only 2% of the Fund has been raised from Africa (Peace Fund, 2013). Moreover, Africa lacks the resources and the accountability that would make it effective in tackling the crises that are unfolding time and again. As the African leaders echo their desire for “African Solutions”, they need to reflect on their dedication to make AfSol a working strategy, which requires finances to be developed, promoted and implemented with.

A true African ownership can only emanate from the commitment of actors at all levels. Commitment of leaders at national, regional and continental level is crucial to the promotion of good governance and prevention of and dealing with conflicts. Citizens should be committed to elect appropriate leaders by being active participants of the process, and the leaders have to be committed to create conducive environment for the people to exercise their duties and achieve their rights.

As a means to assure the fruition of AfSol, building strong African institutions and overcoming the challenge of finding a common ground is a stepping element of institutional commitment. Africans still face the challenge of missing a common ground for unity and action for there is the lack of strong pan-African institutions and systems. In here, traditional
systems are better acknowledged than the whole-sale importation of foreign values. The Somali *Guurti* which made peace and built the state in Somaliland, the *Gacaca* of Rwanda, and the *Obuntu* of Nigeria among others are notable illustrations of the efficiency and the reliability of the African tradition. On the contrary, it is worthless to undermine the role imported values and institutions could play in solving Africa’s problems. This happened for the fact that African countries with the exception of Ghana and Botswana, established legal systems that were a direct replica of their colonizers, after decolonization. Africa’s traditional systems have been reduced to a secondary position and were replaced with structures transplanted from Europe (IPSS, 2014).

### 3.1.3. Shared Values

Shared values are understood as the basis for commitment and ownership of Africa’s peace and security challenges. African states have values that are shared with neighboring states for they might share similar communities or ethnic groups along their borders. Africans have a shared or common history that dates back to slavery and colonialism. Thus, these shared values across regions should forge a platform where shared values form a room for an Africa-wide identity. Therefore, African values found at a certain location, shared with others or not, should be reflected in the solution designed for the people of that locality since those values are shared among the individuals that collectively make up that community (IPSS, 2014).

It is not a mandatory that, if at all possible, for a certain AfSol mechanism to be adopted or accepted by all Africans unanimously. It has to be acknowledged that Africa is so heterogeneous, and its policy makers have to accommodate the values of the different actors, communities and even states. To realize such commonality, shared values could contain tolerance, solidarity, collective security, responsible leadership and citizenry committed to justice, practical solutions and human rights (*Ibid*).

In order to build realistic links between tradition and other „adopted“ systems the collection of commitment, ownership and a sheer determination to construct common values by African leaders is necessary. In here, incorporating useful practices from other value systems is considerable, because African traditional values can go handy for making progress in the resolution of conflicts.

To sum up, to define a particular action or policy as „African“, or an AfSol, a consideration to assess the principles of ownership, commitment and shared values has to be undertaken. This will ensure the Africanization” of the process of formulating a solution. However,
probable failure of some cases while owned and led by Africans cannot be overruled. But, the reason behind such an outcome has to be examined.

4. PRESENTATION, INTERPRETATION AND ANALYSIS OF THE DATA


The African Union Mission in Somalia (AMISOM) is by definition an active, regional peacekeeping Mission operated under the auspices of the AU in collaboration with the UN and other international partners. The Mission was created by AU”s PSC on the 19th of January 2007 with an initial start of six months mandate (AU, 2007).

The Mission is the surrogate of the IGAD-Peace Support Mission to Somalia hailed in the name of IGASOM in 2005. Its aim was to provide protection and training Mission in Somalia to support the Transitional Federal Government to demilitarize the militia as it established itself in Somalia in early 2005 with the hope that it would bring a sense of unity and hope. Nonetheless, this was aborted by the rise of the Union of Islamic Courts (UIC) who were seen as heroes after defeating the US-backed warlord movement called the Alliance for Restoration of Peace and Counter Terrorism (ARPCT). Despite opposition by UIC and its supporters, the AU mandated the deployment of IGASOM in September 2006 (Donatien, 2013).

On December 2, IGAD and the UIC met and cordially published a formal communiqué committing the UIC to the IGAD plans (AU, 2006). On December 6, 2006, the UNSC passed Resolution 1725 authorizing the AU and its member states to establish a protection and training Mission in Somalia (UNSC, 2006). Upon passing the Resolution at the UN, the UIC was openly and militarily opposed to peacekeepers entering Somalia. UIC was also very resistant to allowing frontline countries” troops, especially Ethiopian troops to be part of the Mission. Ethiopia, on its part, was chary of allowing Eritrean troops to be part of the Mission.

Hence, IGAD member states bordering Somalia were not eligible to participate in the Mission according to the UN Resolution 1725. It was also a heavy burden on the remaining three countries in IGAD, i.e., Sudan, Uganda and Eritrea (South Sudan was yet to be born) and the Mission was expanded to include other member states of the African Union. Therefore, IGASOM was misconceived and did not materialize due to the lack of funding and challenges related to the neutrality of the TCCs, given that the potential TCCs were Somalia”s immediate neighbors. These setbacks led the AU to embark on a new initiative and the result was the
birth and deployment of AMISOM (Donatien, 2013). Following a Report from the Chairperson of the Commission on the situation in Somalia and the evaluation and recommendations of the AU Military Staff Committee, the AU PSC decided to authorize the deployment of the AMISOM on 19 January 2007, for an initial period of 6 months (AU, 2007). On 20 February 2007, the UN Security Council adopted UNSC Resolution 1744, which further legitimized AMISOM’s deployment (UN, 2007). The UN supports AMISOM through the UN Office to the AU in Addis Ababa primarily with the provision of military planners. The UNSC met with the AU PSC on 16 June 2007 and discussed the modalities for deeper collaboration. In particular, both bodies discussed the importance of stabilizing Somalia (Osman et al., 2014).

The initial mandate of the Mission has been changed with the current being outlined in an AU PSC Communiqué (2013) and in a UNSC Resolution 2124 (UN, 2013). Thus, AMISOM has been authorized to take all necessary measures as appropriate to carry out its mandate which among others include:

a) support dialogue and reconciliation in Somalia, working with all stakeholders;
b) to provide, as appropriate, protection to the TFIs [Transitional Federal Institutions] and their key infrastructure, to enable them to carry out their functions;
c) to assist in the implementation of the National Security and Stabilization Plan of Somalia;
d) particularly the effective reestablishment and training of all inclusive Somali security forces, bearing in mind the programs already being implemented by some of Somalia’s bilateral and multilateral partners; to provide, within capabilities and as appropriate, technical and other support to the disarmament and stabilization efforts;
e) to monitor, in areas of deployment of its forces, the security situation, to facilitate, as may be required and within capabilities, humanitarian operations, including the repatriation and reintegration of refugees and the settlement of IDPs;
f) to protect its personnel, installations and equipment, including the right of self-defense.

4.2. AMISOM’s Achievement

Remarkably, the security situation in Somalia has significantly changed since the AMISOM
inception in 2007. Even though, the entire country has not been liberated; yet AMISOM has begun to lay strong grounds for the restoration of peace and security in Somalia. Insecurity remains a great concern in many areas of Somalia though. However, the movement from transitional federal government to an elected federal government has been a major step that would have been impossible without the support of AMISOM. Moreover, local administration structures in several parts of the country, particularly areas that have been liberated from Al-Shabaab in the joint operations of AMISOM and the Somali National Security Forces (SNSF), have been established (Donatien, 2013).

Despite these successes, there still remain concerns about the prevailing insecurity in the country by the Somali population, the humanitarian agencies and even the Somali government. A large part of the country is inaccessible and humanitarian needs are always at the hives due to the lack of adequate response and gaps in the required funding.

In all, although there is commendable improvement and momentum in the political process of Somalia, but much more remains to be done to ensure peace and security reigns in Somalia once again for citizens to go back to their normal lives.

4.3. Challenges faced by AMISOM

It is widely noted that, despite the considerable progress made by AMISOM to achieve its mandate, and by extension, to improve the security problem in Somalia, the Mission was not without obstacles and challenges since its inception. The following are the major challenges:

4.3.1. Inability to facilitate establishment of effective and legitimate governance structures

The political power in Somalia can be characterized as local, fragmented, violent, heterogenic, highly contested based on hybrid structures of formal and informal institutions controlled by clans or militias in which different socio-political orders interact (Shinn, 2013). Access to power and resource control have been the sources of conflict among these fluid structures. Bringing this different ends together has been a challenge for peace negotiations and will continue to be in the near future.

Two decades of state collapse have yielded another desirability compounding the traditional prejudice about the nature of state. Beyond the clan issues, the Somalis have traditionally
been nomadic and leery of the interference of the central authority meddling in their affairs (Lewis, 1998). This sentiment was reinforced by the dictatorship that uprooted clan and its associated traditions for some time. The vacuum created in the absence of the state made many Somalis chary of the state. That is why major clans favor a loosely structured federal government that gives them autonomy to rule their own territories. However, this does not mean that tradition will rule these federal states, but the idea is to show how Somalis distrust a central government.

Another challenge is creating trust among the clans to form the federal structure. Trust is currently an endangered commodity in Somalia. The leaders at the top of the Federal Government (FG) are seen as clan representatives than being the leaders of the state hence, their credibility is often marred by clan prejudice and enmity. On the other hand, the government officials are always blamed by clans opposite to the one they come from. So there is a vacuum created in the blame games of tribalism. Thus, this becomes a stumbling block to the activities lying ahead.

4.3.2. Limited Mandates

AMISOM was first created with a Chapter VI mandate restricting them to guard a few government premises and to defend themselves if attacked. Indeed, AMISOM was largely restricted to helping open Mogadishu’s air and sea ports, and helping to protect the TFG’s president and prime minister. These tasks also meant that AMISOM had to guard the Kilometer-4 intersection that linked the airport and the presidential palace. This vacuum benefited Al-Shabaab to grow ideologically and numerically in the entire south-central regions of the country. The restriction of the mandate has largely contributed to the non-desirability of African states to contribute troops to the Mission (Osman, et al, 2014).

Another shortcoming of the mandate is its yearly renewal which meets with obstacles arising from political dimensions, financial constraints and other factors. These include negotiations and compromises between all the stakeholders of the Mission which might reflect complex motives and interests on the autonomy of the Mission. In addition, it creates trotation of contingents by the Troop Contributing Countries (TCCs) (Williams, 2013). This has had serious implication on the performance of the Mission in terms of personnel leaving after they have received intensive trainings and have gathered sufficient knowledge of the terrain and Al-Shabaab operations and tactics.

4.3.3. Lack of Skilled Trainers
The police component of the Mission suffers from shortage of skilled and specialized police trainers. This is compounded by the rotational evacuation that the few skilled and specialized police trainers have to leave at the end of their Mission cycle. This creates a gap and excruciates the already beleaguered security situation.

This negatively affects both the internal and external training cells in AMISOM. The training of AU Peace Support Operations remains a significant challenge because of low level of experience and language problems. Particularly since its latest expansion, AMISOM is hampered by a lack of Somali speakers, who could play a crucial role in the understanding of the local population and the National Security Force (Williams, 2013a).

4.3.4. Understaffing and Lack of Proper Civilian Trainings

Similar to the police component, the civilian component is understaffed and therefore faces challenges to achieve its stated objectives. This stresses their potential to organize and provide trainings for the Mission, in addition to effectively undertaking the generic peace support operations. In a peace support operation, the capacity of the Mission staff has to be enhanced to efficiently perform the mandated tasks needed for the effective execution of the Mission mandate. The trainings therefore, must be based on function, need and performance assessment. However, due to the absence of a structure for function and performance analysis, training has been individual-needs led rather than Mission led (Meleagrou, 2012).

4.3.5. Improper Management of Captured and Voluntarily Disengaged Fighters

In collaboration with other partners, AMISOM has been developing strategies, policies and plans for the management of both the Captured and Voluntary Disengaged Fighters (CVDF). This would help to encourage Al-Shabaab defectors and help fighters who have abandoned militias and armed factions make the transition into civilian life. They also include fighters captured in combat, individuals who have voluntarily surrendered and those who have blended with the local population but are probably willing to surrender if the circumstances are right. This is complicated by the absence of the kind of formal peace agreements that has helped structure many post-war disarmament, demobilization and re-integration (DDR) programs around the world such as the Comprehensive Peace Agreements in Liberia (2003) and Sudan (2005) (Williams, 2013a).

These instruments have been presented to the Federal Government for adoption but, without corresponding provision of adequate financial resources, efforts to offer alternative
livelihoods to former fighters are bound to fail. The result will be that their disengagement from the fighting might only be temporary with disgruntled individuals reverting back to fighting and/or engaging in banditry and other forms of criminality (Williams, 2013b). AMISOM has the mandate to keep the defectors for a period of only 48 hours and hands them to the FGS for further management. However, like the AMISOM, the FGS does not have the capacity to cater for the needs of disengaged fighters (Nues, 2013).

4.3.6. Clan Rivalry

The Somali people are among the most homogenous in Africa sharing the same language, religion and ethnicity. However, their homogeneity has had negative repercussions on their social and political interactions due to the division by an ancient clan system which stands at the foundations of political and social life. Throughout the state collapse, the main rivalry was between clans as politicians appeal to their clans for support and for the provision of militia, for private gains (Lewis, 2008).

As a result there is deep mistrust between the clans and sharing political dividends has always been a problem. The „4.5 scale“ discussed earlier was based on clan system and it is believed to have further divided the Somalis. The conflict between the President and the Prime Minister is compounded by clan prejudice, even if matters arise from personal disagreements. It is also the main configuration issue in the federalization of the country as inter-clan conflicts are the base of state collapse and ongoing political wrestling.

Therefore, the clan system remains a challenge for AMISOM, and there is the need for more robust reconciliation initiative within the country. Current ongoing reconciliations are confined to regional authorities, but national reconciliation has to be convened too.

4.3.7. Dependence on Donor Funds

The lack of sustainable funding poses a serious challenge for AMISOM in terms of continuity of its operations, the provision of the required capabilities and logistical support. While there are several co-existing support models including the UN Trust Fund, the EU African Peace Facility, direct donor support and United Nations Support Office for AMISOM(UNSOA), AMISOM is a heavy burden for the AU. To its credit, UNSOM and the support from the EU has made a big difference, but is still far from meeting most of the needs of the Mission (Williams, 2013b).
4.3.8 Poor Command Control

Commanders in the various sectors choose to report back to their country than to the AMISOM central command. According to some of the participants, this is due to the lack of shared values between the TCCs in terms of intelligence and security with regards to Somalia. This has been a major setback in moving the Mission forward and defeating Al-Shabaab. This is also compounded by the lack of intelligence and information control between the TCCs and their different contingencies within the country.

4.4 Perception of the Somalis about AMISOM

Somalia faces other challenges mostly pertaining to maritime security including piracy, dumping of toxic wastes, proliferation of arms, over-fishing, illegal charcoal exports, among others, along the coast of Somalia. Moreover, there is the persistent existence of Al-Shabaab in offshore areas as well. The Somali people feel highly insecure yet AMISOM has been in the country since 2007 targeting one disenfranchised belligerent group with increased power and is far from eliminating them.

The liberation of areas from Al-Shabaab is steady and slow compared to the large presence of AMISOM in the country. Sporadic attacks on the liberated areas also lead to anxiety among the Somali population. Indeed, the Somali government, which is receiving support from AMISOM, could face credibility deficit as the legitimacy of the government will be questioned and the resulting vacuum could easily be re-occupied by Al-Shabaab (Shinn, 2013).

Many of the Somali participants believe that the AU is experimenting with untested approach to establish and maintain stability peace and a functioning government in Somalia. The Mission seems to be only driven to fighting terror in Somalia and not to effectively establish a government. The international efforts are all devoted towards AMISOM and too little to the Somali National Army (SNA) and the government.

Others believe that TCCs are only there for the interests of their countries. According to these, apart from fighting Al-Shabaab the Mission does not hold benefits for the Somali people. The Somalis need a long term solution and it is through empowering them that those solutions can be achieved.

The non-engagement of AMISOM troops against Al-Shabaab has crystallized into a negative relationship between the common citizen and the intervention force. Majority of
the Somalis are wondering, why it takes so long for AMISOM to eliminate Al-Shabaab. Some of them attribute the reason to be indifference by the TCCs and due to lack of a central command for AMISOM. Many of the Somalis are discontented with the federal structure in Somalia. They totally do not see federalism as the solution for Somalia. They believe a true reconciliation for all the clans that is convened by Somalis themselves will end the hostilities in Somalia. They believe that external powers are neglecting them to exercise their traditional ways of making peace and ensuring security.

Promoters of the federal structures are also suspected of promoting their national interest through perceived „state of weakness” that federalism will bring to a revived Somali state.

4.5. Analyzing AMISOM against the AfSol Pillars set by IPSS

This section will focus on analyzing the AMISOM in Somalia through the lenses of AfSol”s key elements that have been stated earlier. As discussed in the literature review, the three pillars of AfSol are: ownership, commitment and shared values. These three elements have been set by IPSS as the ground pillars for African solutions to African problems. Thus, the section will look at who owns the AMISOM, who are the agents committed and what their commitments are and what values the committed agents share. Hence, it will be left to the reader to decide whether is an African Solution based on those pillars or it is an international solution based on international agendas.

4.5.1. Who Owns the Initiation of AMISOM?

The question of ownership is important for the outcome of peace operations. Historically Africa was passive in many matters surrounding international engagements, but developing a sense of ownership is what has granted Africa to independence, and to date, Africa struggles to own the processes of many ongoing issues that matter to their socio-economic and political aspirations. As the Western world left Africa alone trapped in civil wars, political unrests and economic downturns at the end of the Cold War, Africans showed a common sense that they need to tackle their peace and security challenges themselves. That common sense transformed the OAU to AU and the birth of the APSA (Neus, 2013).

As a result of this transformation AU came up with more pragmatic engagements in the African affairs. One of them is the establishment of AMISOM and the deployment of its troops. This has been assured in the AMISOM mandate of January 19, 200 that authorized
the deployment of an African Mission to Somalia. The AU’s authorization of the mandate was followed by a UN Resolution 1744 that further authorized the Mission at an international level on February, 2007. The fact that the initiation began with AU mandate legally makes the Mission to be owned by the AU. From this simple departure, some people argue that AU owns the Mission because: First, AU owns the mandate as it first authorized the establishment and the deployment of an AU Mission to Somalia; Secondly, The TCCs are all African states; Third, Chapter VIII of the UN Charter encourages African regional arrangement to take the lead in the peaceful resolution of disputes in their own neighborhood.

However, it is worth to note that AU’s mandates need to be authorized by the UN Security Council (UNSC) overseen by the P5. Secondly, Chapter VIII of the UN Charter bans the AU member states from enforcement without the authorization of the UNSC. This implies, the AU cannot deploy troops or conduct security operations without the authorization of those who colonized its member states. The ownership and the freedom to manage AU’s problems is at stake here. Hence, AMISOM is not owned by AU or the Troop Contributing Countries (Esmanjaud & Benedikt, 2008).

Moreover, the AU and its member states or even the Troop Contribute Countries are not ready or in the position to finance the costly operations of AMISOM. This means that they lack the commitment to gather resources for their own problems. Thus, they seek for outside assistance, and their lack of commitment opens the door for external actors to define not only the problems of Africa but also formulate their solutions. Therefore, this raises the question of whether AMISOM is an Africa owned Mission and if these limitations deprive Africa from exerting true ownership to define their problems and formulate their solutions.

However, there is a contending view that it is not the capability problem that opens up African problems to be addressed with global solutions, but the shared responsibility of the UN member states to collectively share the burden of peace and security which is primarily the responsibility of the UN (Osman, et al, 2014).

Nonetheless, according to the tools provided in the IPSS report of the workshop it conducted to conceptualize AfSol, ownership is not about the success but about doing things in one’s own way. Under this tool public ownership of design, process and practice of solutions has been stressed. In addition, African ownership does not represent the narrow dominance of
the African leaders in ownership of decision making, but the ownership of the African people (IPSS, 2014). Taking this view of the report, the public did not play any role in the design and process of AMISOM. Thus, it will be questionable to categorize the AMISOM as an AfSol.

Previously, it was noted that AMISOM has made a considerable success in degrading Al-Shabaab thereby creating for the FGS to move forward. Despite these successes there has been negotiations and dealings at every level of the Mission mostly between the AU and the donors of the Mission involving the FGS to some degree. This disrupts the space for the AU to conduct the Mission in its own ways. This greatly arises from the funding sources who want to make sure that they have a say in the process and practice of the solutions. So this again makes AMISOM an international solution (and not an AfSol).

Another dimension is that the Mission was deployed through the authorization of the AU mandate endorsed by UNSC authorization hence launched to legally operate in Somalia without giving a room to involve the public in designing the Mission. Practically, the Mission has been state-centric in its design dislodging the public involvement. On the other hand, in the process and practice of the solutions, the Mission includes the FGS and the Somali people to a limited extent only. However, it does not give the public some ownership of the design and implementation. In the reconciliation process, for example, representatives from the public are involved as participants of the process but not to lead the process themselves. Thus, AMISOM does not meet this definition of “ownership.”

Moreover, in terms of contribution of troops, it has been difficult for AU to convince African Members States to deploy troops. For one, Somalia has been a dangerous place to send troops to and secondly, many of the states could not see any national interest at stake to compel them to send troops to Somalia. So, the AU was forced to accept troops from the neighboring states of Somalia despite their vested interests. So, this fact raises the question whether it is the AU (Africa) or the Horn of African states own the Mission.

From the above arguments, it can be deduced that ownership of the AMISOM is contested. Then who owns the Somali problems and their solutions? According to the AfSol principles (IPSS, 2014) the Somali people should own the definition of their problems and the formulation of their solutions. The mandate has not given any right to the Somali people to be part of the process. This could have bad legacy at the end of the AMISOM Mission,
because the people did not make it, and so they will not keep it.

4.5.2. **Commitment of the African Agents Involved in AMISOM**

For Africans to own the definitions of their problems, and formulate their solutions, Africans have to dedicate themselves and their resources first. In the case of AMISOM, expenses of the whole Mission is covered through external financial sources mainly from the UN Assessed Peacekeeping Budget, UN Trust Fund for AMISOM, the UN Trust Fund for Somali Security Forces, UN Peace Fund and AU/AMISOM partners mainly the EU (Williams, 2013a). According to the pillars of AfSol, the key indicator towards commitment of AfSol is finance implying that Africans themselves need to own the budget that is running the costs of AfSol. But as is clear, there is no financing source for AMISOM from the AU or even individual African countries (Moller, 2009).

This implies that they have to take part in the design, process and practice of the solution, as in the case in AMISOM. In other words, it means that those who finance the Mission are the owners of that solution. So, in terms of finance, Africa is not committed towards formulating solutions to their problems, due to the reality that they are not ready to take the burden of financing African Missions. It is not poor capacity that makes the Mission dependent on foreign funding, but it is poor commitment. Once the lack of dedication to finance African Missions is observed, then a vacuum is left for foreigners to pay the money with conditions to be met (Solomon, 2012).

Moreover, the availability of troops ready for the Mission has always been difficult even when mandate was there. In a matter of seven years, the Mission got the maximum troop contribution of just above 22,000 uniformed personnel only recently. Many countries have pledged troops and never sent them; others took a long time to send in troops to Somalia. While others like Kenya have sent in troops in an incursion and later re-hatted to AMISOM. Ethiopia, after getting admitted to AMISOM, immediately sent in over 4000 troops in one instant (Bill, 2013).

The lack of commitment has reached to an extent where the TCCs are only concerned about areas adjacent to their borders. For instance, Kenya was only interested in the Jubba Valley (which borders Kenya), and that”s where its troops are based. Likewise to Ethiopia”s troops operate in Beletweyne, Bay and Bakool regions which all border Ethiopia. So the priority for these countries is their national security interests and not Somalia”s peace. Thus,
becoming a TCC is far from a clear indicator of commitment to Somalia’s peace or AMISOM’s mandate.

Another dimension of the commitment aspect of AfSol covers acknowledging traditional systems than a whole importation of foreign values. In reference to AMISOM, the lack of the presence of African Traditional Methods in the whole process shows that AMISOM structure and procedures are an imported solution and that the AU or whoever owns AMISOM is not yet committed to incorporate African traditional methods. In few cases, the elders are involved when their signatures are important. Apparently, African stakeholders in AMISOM are not committed to contemplate the African values of mitigating conflicts and handling security problems in the Mission (Moller, 2009).

4.5.3. Shared Values between the TCCs of AMISOM

The agencies to be committed should have shared values as their basis to their commitment and ownership of Africa’s peace and security challenges. Africa generally shares a common history of slavery and colonialism that makes Africa develop a common identity. For instance, colonialism has divided communities from the same origin into two or more states. Somalis have been divided into Kenya, Ethiopia, Somalia and Djibouti, meaning they share values across these borders to use them to solve their problems (IPSS, 2014). However, community values are not reflected in AMISOM, but state values among the TCCs rather.

Moreover, the TCCs in AMISOM share seemingly similar security threats posed by Alshabaab. They also share the necessity of promoting state recovery to Somalia, but in different forms. For so long, Ethiopia together with members of the international community has pushed for a federated Somalia. This does not mean that federalism is the best solution for Somalia, but seeing federalism as the best way to manage Somalia to the interest of foreign powers, particularly Somalia’s neighbors such as Ethiopia and Kenya. Some of the TCCs like Djibouti have long advocated for forming a unitary state in Somalia which was maimed and aborted by Ethiopia and its western allies (Wickland, 2013).

In another perspective, geo-strategic differences have overshadowed the Horn of Africa for a long time which is reflected in every collective engagement. Ethiopia and Kenya want to make sure that the government in Somalia will not have irredentist agenda for the Somali lands held by Ethiopia and Kenya, which is one of the reasons that they sent in their troops
under the cover of AMISOM or even provided support to the warlords who destroyed Somalia. Other countries, such as Uganda and Burundi contribute troops for economic gains from counter terrorism funds as well as development aid supplied by the West (Williams, 2013a).

From the above points, it is apparent that AMISOM is not an African Solution but rather an International Solution. Secondly, The TCCs have joined the AMISOM meddle in the Somali politics and for the national geo-economic, geo-political and security interests.

5. Conclusion, Recommendation and Way Forward

With the refurbishment of the AU principles, the organization has come up with new spirits and modalities to comprehensively mitigate conflicts in Africa. These spirits are camouflaged in the African ways of solving conflicts. The inclusion of the Panel of the Wise as one of the organs of the APSA is a remarkable move that reminds Africa to look inward to the wisdom of their former leaders and renowned elders. In the speeches of many prominent African leaders, it was clearly reiterated in many platforms, the need for Africa to halt dependency of solutions to their problems on the outside world, particularly the west. Western leaders themselves came to realize that the solutions to the peace and security challenges in Africa lie with the Africans themselves.

Hence, the AU began to consider the matter with cognitive lenses to gather options and approaches to solving Africa’s problems. In the 2009 Tripoli Declaration, the AU recognized the need to build the capacity of African universities and research institutes to explore the nature of African conflicts, to investigate for solutions and options in conflict resolution efforts to arrive at African-centered solutions. The IPSS has become one of the research institutes entrusted to participate in providing academic inputs to the quest for AfSol. The starting point for IPSS has been the struggle to come up with a proper conceptualization of AfSol and an operational framework. Thus, through research, workshops and a dedicated blog, the Institute developed and is refining some basic pillars for AfSol that could guide future researches which would further refine and re-define AfSol. These basic pillars are: ownership, commitment and shared values. The idea behind them is that AfSol processes and practices should reflect an African public ownership, the financial and logistical commitment and the values that Africa share across the continent. These principles have been proven to be operational at processes that are led by the
African communities at the grassroots, for instance, the Guurti in Somaliland, the Gacaca in Rwanda and the Obuntu in Nigeria (for details see IPSS, 2014).

But this is not the only dimension that AfSol should be looked at. The state security system has overshadowed African traditional methods of tackling peace and security challenges, and to a higher level, the AU is struggling to assert that it is capable to play an active role in the peace and security matters of the continent. This research has therefore been conducted to contribute to the further conceptualization of the concept by examining its applicability to top-down „African solutions“ and how „African-centred“ they are, by taking the case of AMISOM which is the largest AU Mission in history.

The research came to understand that the AMISOM has been deployed with an AU mandate authorized by the UN in 2007 with an initial start of six months and a renewal of the mandate for another six months with the expectation to be taken over by a UN Mission. The UN could not gather the support of its Security Council members due to the danger and volatility of the environment and the absence of „lack of peace to keep“ which guides UN Peacekeeping Missions. Apparently, the burden has fallen on the AU to send troops to Somalia for an indefinite period. Through many challenges, the AU has managed to place over 21,000 African troops in Somalia in a period of seven years, with the logistic and financial support of the UN, the EU and other international partners.

As a result, AMISOM has degraded the power of Al-Shabaab in Somalia by capturing its strongholds and thwarting economic sources including major towns, such as Mogadishu, Kismayu and Baidoa. In recent operations, Al-Shabaab has been heavily weakened, but the group still remains a threat to Somalia, the region and to international security. AMISOM has also kept guard of the Somali top leaders, government institutions and revenue sources of the government. The Mission also paved away for the establishment of the Jubaland and Southwest regional administrations. There are similar ongoing peace and reconciliation processes in other parts of the South-central Somalia. With the help of the international support, the Mission pioneered Somalia to take steps towards stabilization and constitutional reforming plans.

With these considerable successes, the Mission did not move without challenges. Internally, the Mission has faced opposition from the Somali people who have been actively mentored by Al-Shabaab that non-Muslims are invading their country, especially after Ethiopia’s
invasion of late 2006 to support the then TFG. With tactical appeals, the group was able to gather public support, revenue and an enormous number of youth fighters. Many AMISOM soldiers especially those assigned in Sector 1 and its surroundings have lost their lives, got injured or captured. The federal government was also judged as foreign backed hence loosing legitimacy in the eyes of the public.

The mandate of the Mission was also a major contributing factor to the challenges. It only allowed the troops to protect government premises and its revenue sources (the seaport and airport) in Mogadishu, and only to act in self-defense. This in turn gave chance for Al-Shabaab to grow economically, politically and numerically. As a result, the group was able to expand its operations to the region by waging bombing attacks in Uganda and Kenya. The group declared itself as a branch of Al-Qaeda in Somalia. It was only when their brutality has been felt in the neighboring countries that the Mission gained momentum to acquire more troops and more concern at the international level. The current mandate has been issued with power of chapter VII, meaning the troops are allowed to engage in combat. But still its renewal once in every year causes rotation of the troops depleting the trained personnel within the components.

Lack of proper and predictable funding has been and sill is another challenge that AMISOM faces in Somalia. Generally, the APSA is to a large extent dependent on foreign aid, and so is AMISOM. Over the years, finance was one of the problems that blocked the contribution of troops to the Mission. Only the military component which is in fact the largest runs perfectly, the police and the civilian component of the Mission are highly under-resourced and understaffed, mainly due to financial problem.

Multiple ownership of the Mission is also a challenge in meeting the mandates of the Mission. Negotiations and dealings take place between the FGS, the UN and other donors and the AMISOM. This means that the interests of all these stakeholders need attention and consideration, hence, leading to delays in activities. There is little or no platform to coordinate the efforts of all these actors especially those supporting Somalia.

It has been a challenge to bring the IGAD member states on board to see the Somali problem in the same lenses. Somalia has fallen prey to the foreign policies of the IGAD member states. For many years they have entangled with each other to place their influences siding separately with the clan factions. Even though, Eritrea froze its membership in
IGAD, it has been engaged in a proxy war with Ethiopia in Somalia. The competition for regional hegemony and the race for global counter terror funds have put consolidated regional efforts into stalemate. Each country wants to see Somalia’s issue from its foreign policy of view, not from the interests of the (future) state and peoples of Somalia.

Finally, the research used the three AfSol pillars to evaluate the AMISOM and its applicability as an African-centered solution. From the ownership perspective, the AU legally owns the AMISOM for it initiated the mandate. Secondly, it owns the Mission as the TCCs should only be from Africa. But in here, a question rises that the fact that the current troops are from East Africa, is it an IGAD Mission or it is a continental Mission? Is ownership of the mandate adequate to say the Mission is an AfSol? Who owns the finance, logistics, technical support, surveillance, authorization among others that run the Mission? On the other hand, AU’s mandate alone cannot spin the Mission without the authorization of the UNSC. Aside from this, the ownership principle in AfSol is „public ownership” in the sense that the communities at the grassroots have to take part in the design, process and practice of the Mission (IPSS, 2014). The Somali people have not been part of the design of the Mission; neither do they own its process and practice. It is a Mission, that everything in it is executed from a top-down approach.

Commitment from African countries to the Mission in terms of troop contribution, pledging funds and diplomatic support should also be scrutinized to confer the AfSol label to the Mission. First, it was difficult to gather troops from Africa as many of the African countries that pledged troops at the start of the Mission failed to send their troops in Somalia. Second, finance is the major indicator in the commitment towards AfSol. As no African country contributed to the Mission and neither is there any initiative at a continental level. The Mission is totally dependent on foreign funding.

In terms of looking at the values that are shared across the AMISOM TCCs, the research identified that AU member states in general and the TCCs in AMISOM in particular agree on the need to end Al-Shabaab in Somalia. Underneath this façade, the reason for this agreement is the national interest/security maximization motive of each TCC. Al-Shabaab masterminded and operated deadly attacks in Kenya and Uganda. The group can also trigger potential Islamists in Ethiopia and network with liberation movements, such as ONLF and OLF which are among the six terrorist-labeled organizations by the House of Peoples’ Representative of Ethiopia. The TCCs, even long before the AMISOM, has been united to
form stability and governance structures in Somalia. But they have not shared similar views on how to go about that. Decentralizing the federal structures has been a problem. Kenya and Ethiopia made vigorous negotiations before establishing the Jubbaland administration, while Djibouti promoted a centralized state.

Therefore, according to the principles, the AMISOM cannot be conferred under the AfSol label. It can be termed as an amalgamation of international efforts backed by divergent interests united under few elements. The AfSol principles fail to explain AMISOM even though AU claims that it is an African solution. It is therefore a pending task for researchers to further refine the concept and its applicability in complex, multi-actor peace operations.

5.1. Recommendations

5.1.1. Refurbishing AMISOM

It is paramount to sustain to the AMISOM initiatives for the Mission to effectively deliver on its mandate. Currently, the mandate is more robust than in previous years, but the yearly extension of the mandate needs to be changed. States also rotate their troop presence in AMISOM. This depletes the trained and skilled personnel by bringing new ones after every year. This makes the Mission a training ground for the TCCs and little a peace operation for Somalia.

Funding is also critical for the sustainability of the Mission, so in addition to seeking funds from outside, AU should take an initiative to search for internal funding sources. This means that African states should be highly committed to the peace and security challenges of the continent. Once they are committed they will own the process and direction of the Mission.

5.1.2. Better and sustained trainings to the SNSF

Al-Shabaab still remains a threat in Somalia and continues to occupy large rural areas. Hence, the joint operations between AMISOM troops and the SNA should not be relented. In addition, training for SNSF should be enhanced. Liberated areas should be effectively controlled to prevent the potential incursion of the vanquished militants. Better and sustained training of the SNSF as well as their upkeep and welfare are paramount to the exit strategy of AMISOM.
5.1.3. Contributing effectively to the security and stabilization plan

The AMISOM should increase the number and battalions of the Formed Police Units (FPUs) to make public management in different parts of the country. The number of specialized police force also need to be increased and sustained. The police are essential in the security of the liberated areas as they take over the responsibility of ensuring the safety of the liberated areas. Thus, once an area is liberated, an immediate deployment of a police unit should follow to enforce laws credibly and convene reconciliation talks.

5.1.4. Better role by the Civilian Component

It is the responsibility of the civilian component to enhance the legitimacy of the government particularly in the liberated areas. It should engage further with existing local structures and dynamics in promoting national reconciliation processes. Enhanced coordination with the central government is essential for the fulfillment of all the tasks of the Mission.

The provision of services such as health, water, and education, among others, to the civilian population is critical in demonstrating the goal of the Mission. Building, gaining and maintaining public confidence is critical in the fight against Al-Shabaab. This is because the militia group is adopting and waging an asymmetric warfare that can only be won with the support of the Somali population only. Public confidence can be gained through creating and implementing a conduct and discipline policy in line with established humanitarian standards; effective investigation and prosecution of allegations of serious misconduct by AMISOM personnel, and adopting disciplinary measures where necessary; Adopting practical and preventive measures in relation to the protection of civilians, including through training and awareness raising programs.

5.1.5. Assuring public ownership of the Mission

All the stakeholders in the Mission should assure that the public participates in the whole process. It is only when the public is empowered that it will protect the legacies of the Mission.

5.2. Way Forward

The pillars of the concept have been designed in a way adoptable and practical at initiatives
from below where state structures have little influence. African solutions from below well fit into the pillars of the concept. For instance, the Somaliland *Guurti* practice of African solutions has had tremendous results in the peace and reconciliation of the country. The process was owned, designed and led by the community elders. Finance and logistics were provided by the clans, and it was the responsibility of the hosting clan to keep the security of the guests and pay all the bills – hosting reconciliation meetings was rotational. The agents who were committed in the process shared clan and religious values that catalyzed their deliberations. Therefore, there is the need to reconsider, refine, or even redefine, the current AfSol principles in ways that simultaneously explain the practices of African solutions from the top and bottom dimensions, in addition to its current predisposition towards grassroots processes.
References


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The preamble to the Constitutive Act of the AU pays tribute to the ideas of pan-Africanism, with a renewed desire to seek internal solutions to Africa’s problems. Its institutions, powers and objectives were meant to bring about a fundamental shift away from the constraints imposed by the principles of non-interference which was replaced with that of non-indifference

1 Unpublished article written by Dawit Yohannes at IPSS on April, 2015, Addis Ababa